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Abstract
IAEA needed a rugged spent fuel attribute tester, SFAT, for verifying spent fuel assem-
blies of the Ukrainian VVER-1000 reactors in line with IAEA safeguards measurement
standards and criteria of verification.
Spent fuel verification using the existing Improved Cerenkov Viewing Device is becoming
more and more difficult and sometimes impossible primarily due to the increasing cooling
time of low burnup assemblies and damaged fuel in closed bottles. Other complicating
factors include dummy assemblies in the ponds, different storage configurations, difficult
access and variation in the quality of the pond water.
The task to develop a SFAT device for the eleven Ukrainian VVER-1000 facilities has been
accomplished under the Finnish Support Programme (FINSP) to the IAEA safeguards
under the Task FIN A 1073. The task made use of the experience gained on designing and
implementing SFAT devices in Finland.
Based on the agreed user requirements, a series of measurement campaigns were jointly
organized by the IAEA Safeguards Department, Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant Opera-
tors and the FINSP first at the Zaporozhye and Khmelnitski NPPs and finally in 2001 at
the Rovno and South Ukraine NPPs.
Several hardware configurations were tested to take into account the measurement
conditions including pond lattice geometry, fuel storage conditions, high background
radiation and the design of the upper part of the VVER-1000 fuel assembly. The best
results were achieved using a large CZT detector, an optimized collimation and precise
positioning using the refuelling machine. The system is now ready for routine inspection
use at nine of the eleven Ukrainian VVER-1000 units.
During the development of this verification method, special attention was paid to minimiz-
ing intrusiveness and maximizing efficiency of the procedure while ensuring compliance
with national and facility level safety regulations in Ukraine.
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Technical and Scientific Centre for the Nuclear and Radiation Safety, Kyiv, Ukraine), BYTCHKOV
Valerij, POPESCU Dorel, LEE Young-Gil, HOSOYA Michio, GOULO Valery (IAEA). VVER-1000 SFAT.
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The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
verifies spent fuel for safeguards purposes. Usual-
ly the verification of the fuel assemblies stored in
storage ponds is performed using an Improved
Cerenkov Viewing Device (ICVD). In cases where
the verification by ICVD turns out to be difficult
or even fails, a complementary method is the
Spent Fuel Attribute Tester (SFAT) [1]. The ra-
tionale behind this task was that there was no
SFAT device available, which could perform the
verification at the VVER-1000 facilities in those
cases where the ICVD would fail.
A great number of the VVER-1000 reactors are
in operation in Eastern Europe, most of them in
Ukraine. The principal verification problem with
those units is connected to the shielded assembly
design and sometimes a poor water quality as
regards contamination and transparency making
both ICVD and SFAT type verification difficult.
The storage capacity of the VVER-1000 fuel
ponds is very limited, and the fuel has to be
transferred away from the reactor after a few
years of cooling. At present a dry storage facility is
in operation at the Zaporozhye NPP and under
construction or projected at other NPPs. This
means that the spent fuel inventories at the reac-
tor storage ponds consist principally of relatively
short-cooled fuel. However, there are also older
1 Introduction
fuel assemblies in the storage ponds and they are
getting difficult to verify by the ICVD. The limited
storage space in the fuel storage ponds of the
reactors makes it necessary to store the long-
cooled assemblies as intermixed with recently
evacuated high burnup assemblies. Adjacent re-
cently evacuated assemblies induce a high back-
ground of scattered radiation at the detector posi-
tion thus cumbering the detection of characteristic
peaks of long-cooled assemblies under verification.
Another problem are the closed bottles in the
storage ponds intended for storage of leaking fuel
assemblies. A bottle may be declared as containing
a fuel assembly or declared as empty. In both cases
a clear verification is needed. If this problem
cannot be solved using a SFAT device other devic-
es e.g. IRAT could be used, instead.
The goal of this task was to design and con-
struct a prototype SFAT device suitable for the
VVER-1000 facilities in Ukraine. This report con-
cludes the results obtained. Starting from the end
user's requirements [2], the final design has been
developed through consecutive design and test
measurements. The final design presented com-
bines the virtues of the IAEA standard SFAT with
the new results received during this task. Descrip-
tion of the evolvement of the task can be found in
the previous interim reports [2–5].
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A SFAT device is used to verify the spent fuel
assemblies in the intermediate spent fuel storag-
es. It should be able to distinguish a spent fuel
assembly from any other radiating artefact, e.g.
irradiated dummy assembly, stored in the storage
pond, but not containing irradiated nuclear fuel.
This level of verification is called gross defect. The
fuel assemblies are not moved or touched during
the measurement. Instead, the instrument is
moved and positioned above each assembly to be
verified. Normally the assemblies are stored in a
tight array in the storage pond preventing the
access from aside and allowing only the measure-
ment of the radiation emanating upwards.
The SFAT device consists of a gamma detector,
a radiation shielding and an air-filled collimator
pipe enclosed in a watertight housing. The device
is submerged into the pond water and the detector
views through its collimator pipe characteristic
radiation of fission products emitted from the
spent fuel assembly located right beneath the
SFAT device. Directly in front of the detector there
may be an additional collimator and radiation
shield made of heavy material e.g. lead or tung-
sten.
The radiation is measured using an energy-
dispersive detection system, usually a multi-chan-
nel pulse-height analyser. Energy dispersion al-
lows for detecting radiation specific to fission
products, thus indicating that the target contains
fissile material and fission products produced by
irradiation in a nuclear reactor. In order to detect
efficiently radiation directly emanated from the
spent nuclear fuel region of the assembly under
verification, the collimation of the device must be
properly devised. Concurrently care must be tak-
en that the device would not see the full-energy
radiation emanating from the adjacent assem-
blies. The principal target radiation to indicate the
presence of irradiated nuclear material is the 662
keV gamma peak of 137Cs.
2 Principle of operation of SFAT
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3 General information on VVER-1000
3.1 VVER-1000 assemblies
The fuel assemblies have a hexagonal cross sec-
tion and they are stored in a hexagonal lattice in
the fuel pond. The structure of the top of a fuel
assembly is displayed in Figure 1. The active
length of a fuel rod is 3530 mm. In the rods, above
Figure 1. Structure of the top of a VVER-1000
fuel assembly.
the fuel pellets there is a zirconium plug of 50 mm
in length. The top of the fuel assembly is about
750 mm above the top of the active zone. The top
of the fuel assembly is a cylindrical tube with the
outer diameter about 175 mm. Inside the cylinder
there is space for the control rod assembly, which
is inserted in the control rod channels of the fuel
assembly through this cylinder. The irradiated
control rod assemblies are stored in the fuel as-
semblies. The top part of the fuel assembly serves
also as the handle for the attachment of the fuel
assembly to the refuelling machine. The support-
ing elements of the handle are two claws on the
opposite sides of the outside top of the cylinder.
These claws attach to the refuelling machine. The
cylindrical top part continues with a conical shoul-
der at about 275 mm below the top of the assem-
bly. The shoulder prevents the access closer to the
fuel. The tip of the SFAT collimator tube cannot
approach closer than about 480 mm above the top
of the fuel pellets.
As for radiation source an irradiated assembly
consists of two main zones. The first zone, which is
closest to the detector, is the irradiated stainless
steel head, radiating mainly gamma rays of 60Co.
The second zone is the fuel containing fission
fragments, with 137Cs as the principal gamma
emitter, starting about half a metre lower. High-
energy gamma radiation from the head produces a
strong background of multiply scattered gamma
rays, which may hide the relatively weak target
signal of lower energy. Below the shoulder of the
assembly, indicated as B in Figure 1, is the place
where the fuel is least shielded from the SFAT
instrument. The target area for positioning the
SFAT device is shown in Figure 2.
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3.2 Interim spent fuel storage
Figure 3 presents the pond structure of the Zapo-
rozhye NPP units. The spent fuel is stored in two
interim storage ponds of the reactor hall, TG21B01
and TG21B03 in Figure 3. Adjacent to the storage
ponds there are two smaller ponds, a maintenance
pond, TG21B02, which is used for fuel storage too,
and a universal socket.
The fuel is stored in the racks with a hexagonal
lattice configuration. There are racks for normal
and tight storage. For normal storage the lattice
pitch is 400 mm between the centres of the assem-
blies and the gap between assemblies is about
130 mm. For tight storage the pitch is about
320 mm and the gap 40 mm, see Figure 4. The
leaking assemblies are closed individually in her-
metic bottles, which are stored in large ponds.
There are simultaneously high burnup (BU)
assemblies with the cooling time (CT) equal to 0–5
years and assemblies with low burnup and long
cooling time in the ponds. Leaking assemblies are
stored in the interim storage ponds for the time
being. Accordingly they may have considerably
long cooling times.
In a conservative approach one should be able
to verify a low burnup and long cooling time
assembly surrounded by high burnup and short
cooling time ones in tight storage conditions.
3.3 Cooling pond water
The water may be contaminated by chemical and
radioactive impurities. Contamination makes the
verification of assemblies by ICVD in some cases
rather problematic during high water level.
Radioactive contamination could lead to the
situation that an improperly shielded detector
unit would register 137Cs radiation in an empty
position of the pond and the signal might be
comparable to that of a real low burnup and long
cooling time assembly.
The maximum cooling pond water contamina-
tion level ever registered at the Zaporozhye NPP
is approximately 4 MBq/l. The principal contami-
nants are 137Cs and 134Cs. Usually the contamina-
tion level during the verification campaigns does
not exceed one tenth of this maximum. Such a
strong possible background level poses additional
demands to the detector shielding and measure-
ment geometry. Gamma radiation should not pen-
etrate the detector from directions other than
from the assembly under verification.
The device shielding, measurement geometry
and positioning system must comply with the
demands derived from the high background level,
from the structure of the assemblies and from the
storage geometry.
Figure 2. The target area available for detection
of fission-product isotopes in a VVER-1000 assem-
bly. The small circles indicate individual fuel
rods.
Ø47
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Figure 3. The arrangement of the reactor and the fuel storage ponds at ZNPP units.
Figure 4. Two arrangements of assemblies in the VVER-1000 storage ponds. a) Normal storage lattice.
b) Tight storage lattice.
10
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4.1 Intended application
The SFAT should serve as a verification instru-
ment for spent fuel stored in ponds at VVER-1000
facilities for
1) long cooling time items;
2) low burnup items;
3) fuel in closed containers/bottles.
The problem of spent fuel items stored in closed
containers or bottles should also be considered as
a target.
Before routine use may start, the SFAT must
pass the acceptance tests for a routine use instru-
ment. This includes meeting the system technical
and safety specifications and undergoing a formal
usability test or its equivalent in terms of field
exercises.
The SFAT would be the instrument of choice
for inspection gamma measurement applications
requiring transportability, ease of use and durabil-
ity. This would include attribute measurements
for fission products contained in spent fuel assem-
blies designed for VVER-1000 reactors. The sys-
tem should be able to distinguish between fuel
and non-fuel items, also in the presence of contam-
inated water.
4.2 Required performance
By positioning the SFAT above the fuel assem-
blies, above other similar items or above contain-
ers in VVER-1000 spent fuel ponds, the system
should be capable of
1) identifying, in situ, spent fuel through low or
medium resolution gamma spectrometry;
2) determining the spent fuel presence in individ-
ual fuel assemblies in the spent-fuel pond;
3) determining the spent fuel presence in closed
containers or bottles, in this case another veri-
fication geometry may be accepted;
4) provide yes/no answer in-situ for each meas-
urement, regardless the condition of water con-
tamination in the pond.
The system shall be designed in such a way that
1) it has optimum size and weight and is accepta-
ble to the operator;
2) it is rugged, capable of transport with a special
transport container, which should be provided;
3) it allows for simple installation into the refuel-
ling machine or other operator accepted equip-
ment, fast turn on and it is easy to make it
available for operation;
4) it has diagnosis capabilities and indication of
operational problems;
5) is waterproof and can be stored under water
when not in use;
6) is easy to be decontaminated on site.
4.3 Facility details and installation
requirements for any facility specific
applications
The technical specifications of VVER-1000 SFAT
should be in line with the State (Ukraine) and
facility safety regulations. The conditions are de-
scribed in documents issued by Ukrainian Author-
ities and nuclear facilities in Ukraine, where such
an instrument is to be used.
The system should be useable in conditions of
the environment typical to these facilities includ-
ing power supply, radiological and safety hazard
matters.
4.4 Operating requirements
The measurement electronics will need to operate
for up to 8 hours on back-up batteries if AC is not
available and provide sufficient data storage for a
typical inspection. The temperature and humidity
range should equal the conditions specific to spent
fuel pond areas of VVER-1000 facilities and be
environment specific in VVER-1000 reactors.
4 User requirements
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4.5 Reliability and maintenance
The SFAT should be highly reliable with a mean
time between failures (MTBF) of better than 3
years, depending on the frequency of usage. The
SFAT should have modular design allowing simple
and quick maintenance on the spot through modu-
lar replacement of the detector sensor package. A
person responsible for maintaining the equipment
should be established.
4.6 Data acquisition and processing
IAEA standard equipment should be used.
The system shall carry out the following func-
tions:
1) Collect gamma-ray spectra and determine the
energy and presence of prominent lines;
2) Determine the presence of spent fuel;
3) Convenient identification and storage of indi-
vidual measurements;
4) Connectable to a computer for review or print
out of measurements.
The necessary acquisition time should be mini-
mised in order to reduce inspection time. The ac-
ceptable time for verification of one assembly has
not been specified, but it can be assumed that
about 5 minutes would be reasonable. For excep-
tional cases also a longer measurement time could
be acceptable.
4.7 Authentication
SFAT shall be operated in an attended mode. No
authentication is necessary. The system should
satisfy Agency requirements with respect to
tamper indication—i.e. provisions to be kept un-
der seal, etc.
4.8 Calibration
Upon completion of detailed tests of its perform-
ance characteristics, the system should be calibrat-
ed for various sensor modules (e.g. CdTe or NaI).
The calibration should be done in such a way that
the reproducibility should be achieved simply by
turning on the system. The system calibration
should be easily monitored.
4.9 Documentation
A paper master and electronic copies in Microsoft
Word (or other acceptable text editor) of the fol-
lowing documents should be supplied to the Agen-
cy:
1) Functional Requirement Specification
2) Acceptance Test Plan
3) Design Specifications
4) Quality Assurance Plan (this is optional, but
consideration should be given if the develop-
ment warrants this document)
5) Safety Evaluation Documentation
6) An Operating Manual to the Agency format
7) Maintenance Manual
8) Software Documentation.
A short procedure sheet should also be foreseen.
In addition, the system documentation shall be
available for service and repair and for NPP oper-
ators. Training material for use at the Agency
shall be available and training shall be given to
inspectors.
12
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5.1 IAEA SFAT design and operation
A transportable SFAT device is readily available
at the IAEA and authorized for use in gross-defect
level verification of spent fuel storages. [6] The
IAEA SFAT device is relatively lightweight,
<20 kg, and can be equipped with collimator pipes
of different lengths, up to 2500 mm. It is handled
by a hand-winch to be attached in the handrails of
the fuel-handling machine. Correct positioning
above the target assembly is implemented using
the fuel-handling machine. Vertical positioning,
when above the target, is done using the winch.
Tests with VVER-1000 fuel have been made
with the IAEA standard SFAT at the Kozlodui
NPP in Bulgaria. A clear fission-product finger-
print was obtained in some of the cases (a certain
burnup/cooling-time range), but the reliability of
the verification and the verification for all cases
specified in the user requirements could not be
established. Complementary tests have been made
at the Khmelnitski and Rovno NPPs, but the
optimum geometry could not be established. There
were also problems in positioning the device above
the target assembly and in verifying the correct
positioning. Subsequently the Ukrainian Regula-
tory Authority has forbidden handling of such
devices from the edge of the fuel pond due to
safety risks. The only remaining alternative was
to mount the SFAT device in the refuelling ma-
chine.
5.2 FINSP approach
The approach of the FINSP was
• to find an accurate and reproducible position-
ing system for the SFAT,
• to find an optimum measurement geometry
and detector shielding,
• to test and find an optimal detector.
Good experience on the operation of the SFAT de-
vice using the fuel-handling machine at the inter-
mediate storage of the Olkiluoto NPP in Finland
[7] encouraged looking into possibilities to use the
refuelling machine of the VVER-1000 facility for
handling and positioning of the SFAT device. How-
ever, some basic differences both in the design of
the fuel-handling machines and in their operation
made the application of the VVER-1000 refuelling
machine into this purpose nontrivial.
Although VVER-1000 facilities are very similar
in construction, the fuel storage ponds and refuel-
ling machines differ. Refuelling machine construc-
tion is one of the key issues in using the SFAT.
Some main differences are described below.
The operative body of all VVER-1000 refuelling
machines is the mast. The mast consists of 3
coaxial tubes for adjustment of the height. The
outer tube is fixed in the machine body. The
middle tube is an extension and the inner tube has
the grapple for the assemblies. The refuelling
machines of all Zaporozhye (ZNPP) units have
equal construction. The middle tube is hanging on
the inner tube and forms a mechanical shield for
the assemblies to be transferred. It cannot be
lifted independently. Opposite to the ZNPP, the
middle tube of the South Ukraine NPP (SUNPP)
refuelling machines can be lifted independently.
As a consequence facility-specific attachment
mechanisms had to be designed.
Operation of the refuelling machine is per-
formed remotely in the machine control room and
it is monitored through the digital position indica-
tor and the underwater video system of the ma-
chine. The machine operator is not present in the
reactor hall. The inspector in the reactor hall and
the refuelling machine operator can communicate
by telephone. This could require the presence of
5 SFAT approaches for VVER-1000
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two inspectors, one in the reactor hall for running
the measurements and another in the machine
control room to observe that the SFAT is correctly
being positioned. This requirement was not attrac-
tive to the end user.
The approach selected for the optimization of
the geometry is based on the relationship between
the luminosity and the geometrical parameters of
the measurement:
2T D
A A
L A
R
⋅
∝ ⋅Ω = .T D (1)
Here AT denotes the target area seen by the detec-
tor on the level of the top of the fuel, and AD
denotes the area of the detector entrance window.
R denotes the distance between the detector and
the top of the fuel. This would call for maximizing
the target area and the detector size and minimiz-
ing the distance. One can see in Figures 1 and 2
that the fuel design severely limits the available
target area. In addition to maximizing the signal
by maximizing the value of eq. (1), one must take
into account the background emitting from the
array of the fuel assemblies stored in the pond. In
the first approximation this array represents an
infinite-area surface source. The radiation at the
detector position of this kind of source does not
depend on the distance itself, only on the attenu-
ating material between the source and the detec-
tor. As the attenuating power of lead or tungsten
vastly overweighs that of water, it was decided
that the geometry should be based on making the
distance as short as practicable and taking care of
the background shielding using heavy material,
lead and tungsten, as appropriate, around and in
front of detector. One factor affecting the optimum
collimator design is that the entrance of the colli-
mator pipe cannot be brought closer than about
480 mm from the upper level of the active zone of
the fuel pins in the assembly. The structural mate-
rial and water between the active zone of the fuel
assembly and the collimator pipe entrance consid-
erably attenuates the full-energy peak of the di-
rect radiation making the detection of the 137Cs
photopeak a demanding task.
The detector should be chosen in such a way
that it would provide the maximum signal–to–
noise ratio for a certain measurement time. The
most efficient detectors seem the most attractive,
but there are also other parameters playing a role
in this choice, e.g. availability, price, physical size,
resolution etc. One must also consider detectors of
mature technology, e.g. scintillation detectors, NaI
or BGO, against modern detector types, where the
technology is under active development, e.g.
CdZnTe (CZT) detectors. In the latter case also the
prospects and expectations of their development
in the near future should be taken into account.
14
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2
3
4
5
1 - SFAT Body
2 - Adapter
3 - Ferrule
4 - Mast of refuelling machine
5 - Cable
6.1 Early measurement campaigns
The first measurements were taken in 1998 at the
Zaporozhye NPP. [2] Based on those measure-
ments it was established that the effect can be
seen and high and medium burnup assemblies can
be verified using a 1500 mm long collimator pipe
of 30 mm inner diameter using either a 2×0.5" NaI
or a 40×40 mm BGO detector. It was also found
that the shielding used was not sufficient at high
water contamination level with these detectors.
Additionally, it was noticed that the operation of
the SFAT device from the bridge of the refuelling
machine involves risks attached to the remote op-
eration of the refuelling machine. More accurate
positioning was required.
For the next two of campaigns, which took
place in 1999 at the Zaporozhye NPP [3, 4] a
method to attach the SFAT device into the refuel-
ling machine was devised and an approval to this
arrangement was obtained both from the Ukraini-
an Authority and from the facility operator. The
only possibility for attaching the SFAT in the
refuelling machine was to use the middle tube.
The vertical position was adjusted by lifting the
inner tube from which the middle tube is hanging.
The SFAT was attached to the middle tube using a
special attachment ferrule, see Figure 5.
In these campaigns, a long (1.63 m) and a short
(0.63 m) collimator pipe were tested using a 500
mm3 CZT detector and larger scintillation detec-
tors (NaI and BGO). The best results were ob-
tained using the CZT detector and short collima-
tor pipe with additional lead cylinders in the pipe
to shield against direct radiation from nearest
6 Review of measurement campaigns
Figure 5. Schematic picture of a VVER-1000
SFAT device as installed into the refuelling
machine of the ZNPP.
neighbours. The results of these campaigns were
reported in ref. [3].
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6.2 Campaign at Zaporozhye NPP
in 2000
A complementary campaign with the presence of
an IAEA inspector was organised in 2000. In this
campaign all assemblies were successfully verified
except for an assembly closed in a hermetic bottle
using the device shown in Figure 6. [4] Here a 300
mm extension was added in front of the short colli-
mator pipe. The assemblies measured in this cam-
paign are listed in Table I. Fifteen assemblies were
measured during this campaign. The assembly
#ED5871 was closed in the hermetic bottle. The
peak analyses were made using the IAEA stand-
ard software (SfatW95).
Table I. The assemblies measured at the ZNPP in 2000.
No
Assembly 
ID #
File 
name
Year of 
discharge
Burnup 
(GWd/t)
Live 
time (s)
Dead 
time (%)
Peak 
area S/E
Verification 
(Y/N)
1 0342 0342 1988 31.67 300 1.0 1307 3.00 Y
2 0349 0349 1988 31.67 300 1.0 1509 5.00 Y
3 0354 0354-2 1988 31.67 300 1.0 1546 6.00 Y
4 0255 A0255 1986 12.65 300 1.3 483 2.30 Y
5 0256 A0256 1986 12.65 300 1.3 523 2.70 Y
6 0260 A0260-4 1986 12.65 600 1.2 681 2.00 Y
7 0227 A0227-3 1986 13.20 300 0.7 371 2.10 Y
8 0250 A0250 1986 13.20 300 1.3 399 1.50 Y
9 0406 A0406 1987 18.18 300 1.6 465 1.90 Y
10 0414 A0414 1987 18.18 300 2.0 435 1.80 Y
11 0462 A0462 1987 18.18 300 2.0 817 3.30 Y
12 0463 A0463 1987 18.67 300 1.3 841 3.70 Y
13 0469 A0469 1987 18.67 300 2.0 750 2.80 Y
14 N7269 7269-1 1998 17.43 300 6.8 2035 2.80 Y
15 ED5871 Bottle 1997 41.52 600 0.0 51 0.90 N
Figure 6. The SFAT device used at the ZNPP.
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Two spectra of low burnup (BU=12.7 GWd/t) long-
cooled assemblies measured at the ZNPP in the
tight storage lattice are presented in Figure 7.
Both assemblies gave a clear verification signal.
The assembly #0260 was measured for 10 minutes
whereas a measurement of 5 minutes was suffi-
cient for verifying the assembly #0256. Figure 8
displays another case of low burnup long-cooled
assembly #0227 together with a spectrum taken
between high burnup assemblies in a tight lattice.
Although the overall count rate is three times
higher in the measurement taken between high
burnup assemblies, no peaks are seen in this
measurement. This proves that the vision of direct
radiation from adjacent assemblies is sufficiently
prevented in the geometry used at the ZNPP. From
Table I one can see that all assemblies except one
in the closed bottle were successfully verified in
this campaign.
6.3 Campaign at Rovno NPP in 2001
A CZT detector of 1500 mm3 was tested with an
IAEA standard SFAT device for the first time at
the Rovno NPP. It was concluded that a long colli-
mator geometry, a total pipe length of 2.7 m, to-
gether with a 1500 mm3 CZT detector should be
applicable for verification of spent VVER-1000 as-
semblies, even those with low burnup and long
cooling time. The interference of adjacent assem-
blies was found to be not noticeable in the tight
storage lattice. The shielding was found to be in-
sufficient for the large CZT detector. Also the posi-
tioning of the IAEA standard SFAT device was
found to be cumbersome and to require improve-
ments.
6.4 Campaign at South Ukrainian NPP
in 2001
The last campaign took place in 2001 in the South
Ukrainian NPP. In this campaign an IAEA stand-
ard SFAT device was used with a 1500 mm3 CZT
detector. The detector shield was reinforced by
changing the original shield material from lead
into tungsten and adding a lead collimator,
100 mm in length and 40 mm in diameter, in front
of the detector shield, see Figure 9. A three-pipe
collimator of the IAEA standard SFAT, 2.7 m in
total length, was used.
As the tubes of the SUNPP refuelling machine
can be lifted independently, a simpler way was
chosen to attach the SFAT device in the mast. A
special interface was produced, which imitates the
top of the assembly, where the IAEA standard
SFAT was attached to, see Figure 10. This imitat-
ed fuel top was attached to the refuelling machine
using the normal fuel grapple. The position accu-
Figure 7. Spectra of two low burnup long cooled
(BU=12.7 GWd/t, CT=14 years) assemblies meas-
ured at ZNPP. Assembly #0256 gave a clear verifi-
cation with a measurement of 300 s, whereas as-
sembly #0260 required 600 s of measurement time.
Figure 8. A low burnup (BU=13.2 GWd/t, CT=14
years) assembly and a spectrum measured be-
tween high burnup assemblies in a tight lattice of
ZNPP. Measurement time 300 s.
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Figure 9. Enhancement of the detector shielding of the IAEA standard SFAT. Above: Shielding of
standard SFAT. Below: Enhanced shielding used at SUNPP for CZT-1500 detector.
1 IAEA standard SFAT
2 Adapter body imitating fuel assembly head
3 Bayonet to lock SFAT
4 Shaft to secure SFAT locking
5 Brackets imitating those of fuel assembly head1
2
2
3
4
5
5
Figure 10. Refuelling machine adapter to the IAEA standard SFAT used at the SUNPP.
18
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 9 2
Table II. List of assemblies measured at the SUNPP campaign. Filename refers to the storage position
in the fuel pond.
No
Assembly 
ID #
File 
name
Year of 
discharge
Burnup 
(GWd/t)
Live 
time (s)
Dead 
time (%)
Peak 
area S/E
Verification 
(Y/N)
1 4370 B0138F 1990 12.36 300 5.5 2802 6.5 Y
2 4371 B0227F1 1990 12.36 300 20.0 2931 4.4 Y
3 4371 B0227F2 1990 12.36 300 23.0 3525 3.1 Y
4 4275 B1023F 1994 40.90 300 5.6 7633 6.6 Y
5 3737 B1021F 1993 9.55 300 1.7 624 3.8 Y
6 6836 B1336F 1995 8.90 300 12.0 3211 5.7 Y
7 4372 B0445F 1990 12.36 300 2.8 1945 6.0 Y
8 3372 B1045F 1994 48.38 60 7.5 1804 5.4 Y
9 3364 B1043F 1994 48.45 60 9.6 1740 5.7 Y
10 3362 B1041F 1994 48.45 60 10.0 1875 6.2 Y
11 3363 B1039F 1994 48.48 60 7.8 1869 4.1 Y
12 4918 B1037F 1994 40.93 60 8.9 869 3.7 Y
13 3373 B1035F 1994 48.57 60 9.0 1803 4.3 Y
14 4916 B1033F 1994 40.86 60 9.0 1152 4.4 Y
15 3361 B1031F 1994 48.49 60 7.8 1415 4.1 Y
16 4279 B1029F 1994 40.93 60 7.0 1306 4.8 Y
17 4280 B1027F 1994 40.94 60 6.5 907 3.6 Y
18 4276 B1025F 1994 40.95 60 6.8 1007 3.2 Y
19 4275 B1023FS 1994 40.90 60 5.6 1473 5.9 Y
20 3737 B1021FS 1993 9.55 60 1.3 453 2.6 Y
racy is equal both in SUNPP and in ZNPP.
Table II lists the fuel assemblies measured at
the SUNPP. A total number of seventeen assem-
blies were measured. Three assemblies were meas-
ured twice, one #4371, the most difficult one,
because of a difficulty to obtain a clear 137Cs peak.
Two assemblies #3737 and #4275 were measured
using a 5 minutes’ measurement and a short 60
S T U K - Y TO - T R 1 9 2
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seconds’ measurement.
Figure 11 shows a presumably difficult case for
verification, where a long cooled low burnup
(ID #4370, BU=12 GWd/t, CT=11 years) assembly
is stored next to four short cooled high burnup
assemblies (two of BU=40 GWd/t, CT=0.5 years,
two of BU=44 MWd/t, CT=1.5 years). The dead
time of the measurement was 5.5%. A clear peak
of 137Cs is seen, and the corresponding background
measurement taken between the target assembly
and a neighbour shows that no nearest-neighbour
contamination exists. All background measure-
ments taken between each target and its neigh-
bouring assembly confirm this conclusion.
The most difficult case found in the pond,
assembly #4371, had six nearest-neighbours, five
of them discharged during the last reloading out-
age and having a cooling time of about 0.5 a. The
sixth neighbour had a cooling time of 1.5 a. The
burnup of the neighbours was 34–48 GWd/t. The
dead time due to extremely active neighbours was
20–23%. The two spectra shown in Figure 12 were
taken from two positions above the assembly op-
posite to the centre axis. Although hardly visible
by an eye, the SfatW95 peak analysis software
revealed a significant 137Cs peak. Anyway, should a
case like that shown in Figure 12 occur in an
inspection, it would always be possible to reverify
in a later inspection.
This last test confirms that all spent fuel as-
semblies stored in the storage ponds of VVER-
1000 reactors can be verified with a SFAT device
except for those enclosed in hermetic bottles.
Figure 12. The most difficult case of verification
at SUNPP. See explanation in the text.
Figure 11. Verification of an assembly #4370 at
SUNPP. Background spectrum was taken just next
to the assembly showing no indication of the full-
energy peaks.
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The results obtained in the ZNPP and SUNPP
campaign confirm that all VVER-1000 assemblies
stored in the racks of the fuel ponds can be veri-
fied with a SFAT device attached to the refuelling
machine. In the ZNPP campaigns a heavily shield-
ed SFAT device was used consisting of a short
collimator and a 500 mm3 CZT detector, see figure
6, whereas in the SUNPP campaign the device
consisted of an IAEA standard SFAT body
equipped with enhanced shielding and a 1500 mm3
CZT detector using the long collimator pipe geom-
etry.
A facility-specific adapter is needed to attach a
SFAT device into the refuelling machine for each
facility. Such an adapter already exists at two
Ukrainian facilities, South Ukrainian and Zaporo-
zhye NPPs, and a readiness of the use of a SFAT in
safeguards inspections has been attained in those
two NPPs comprising nine out of the eleven
7 Summary
Ukrainian VVER-1000 units.
A measurement time of 60 seconds is sufficient
for a positive verification in most of the cases. In
extreme cases, if a low burnup long cooled assem-
bly is stored next to recently discharged high
burnup assemblies the measurement time may
have to be extended up to 20 minutes. On the
other hand, the activity of recently discharged
assemblies decreases quite rapidly during their
first years of cooling. Should the verification fail
for this reason, it will always be possible to obtain
a positive verification after an additional cooling
period, e.g. one year,
The present design allows the use of all IAEA
standard gamma spectrometry hardware and soft-
ware as it is used in the IAEA standard SFAT
device. This ensures that the user requirements,
as presented in sec. 4, are automatically fulfilled
as they are in the IAEA standard SFAT device.
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